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ABSTRACT
Algorithmic fairness is receiving significant attention in the academic and broader literature due
to the increasing use of predictive algorithms, including those based on artificial intelligence. One
benefit of this trend is that algorithm designers and users have a growing set of fairness measures
to choose from. However, this choice comes with the challenge of identifying how the different
fairness measures relate to one another, as well as the extent to which they are compatible or mutually
exclusive. We describe some of the most widely used fairness metrics using a common mathematical
framework and present new results on the relationships among them. The results presented herein can
help place both specialists and non-specialists in a better position to identify the metric best suited for
their application and goals.
1 Introduction
The risks that algorithms—including those embedded in AI systems—can raise concerns relating to bias are well
recognized. Addressing algorithmic bias requires an understanding of normative conceptions of fairness, and how
they can be quantitatively measured. Moreover, algorithm designers and users will need to make informed decisions
regarding which one or more of multiple possible fairness measures should be used for system assessments.
While fairness measures in relation to issues such as testing have been a topic of academic and broader interest for
decades [1], recent years have seen rapidly growing interest among researchers within and beyond the technical
community in the issue of algorithmic fairness. The proliferation of papers describing fairness measures has spurred
examination of the mathematical relationships among them. For example, Kleinberg et al. [2] considered three fairness
measures (calibration within groups, balance for the positive class, and balance for the negative class), and showed that
“except in highly constrained special cases, there is no method that can satisfy these three conditions simultaneously.”
Chouldechova [3] has also written on the incompatibilities between fairness criteria and has observed that test-fairness,
a measure “originating in the field of educational and psychological testing” can, when applied in the context of
recidivism prediction, “lead to considerable disparate impact when recidivism prevalence differs across groups.” In
another paper examining criminal risk assessments [4], Berk et al. have observed that it is generally “impossible to
maximize accuracy and fairness at the same time, and impossible simultaneously to satisfy all kinds of fairness.”
Verma et al. [5] have “collect[ed] the most prominent definitions of fairness for the algorithmic classification problem,
explain[ed] the rationale behind these definitions, and demonstrate[d] each of them on a single unifying case-study.” In
a paper titled “Fairness Through Awareness” [6], Dwork et al., considered “fairness in classification, where individuals
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are classified . . . and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group,
while maintaining utility for the classifier.” Selbst et al. [7], have considered the broader societal context of seeking fair
algorithms, and have argued that attempts to “produce fairness-aware learning algorithms, and to intervene at different
stages of a decision-making pipeline to produce ‘fair’ outcomes” can be “dangerously misguided when they enter the
societal context that surrounds decision-making systems.”
While the papers cited above are drawn from technical publications, algorithmic fairness is also receiving rapidly
growing attention in the legal scholarship. Examples include Mayson [8] who has argued that “[a]lgorithmic risk
assessment has revealed the inequality inherent in all prediction, forcing us to confront a problem much larger than
the challenges of a new technology,” MacCarthy [9], who “describe[d] and assesse[d] various group and individual
statistical standards of fairness, including the mathematical conflict between the two that requires organizations to
choose which measure to satisfy,” and Hellman [10], who has explored the role of “parity in the ratio of false positives
to false negatives.”
Against this backdrop, the present paper offers several new contributions. First, as many previous publications each only
consider a relatively small subset of fairness measures, differences in terminology and definitions can make comparisons
among a broader group of measures difficult to perform. To address this, we describe some of the most widely cited
fairness measures using a common mathematical and notational framework. Second and more substantively, we derive
and discuss a set of mathematical relationships that facilitate comparisons among these metrics. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents metrics using a common mathematical framework and also aims to
address some of the terminology variations across authors. Section 3 details the relationships between various metric
pairs, including consideration of conditions under which they become mutually incompatible as well as trade-offs
involved in selecting one metric over the other. Section 4 offers a discussion and conclusions.
2 Fairness metrics
2.1 Definitions
In the initial portion of the discussion herein we focus on binary predictions and their relationship to binary outcomes.
We subsequently consider metrics that generate a continuous-valued score. In the binary context we assume that
prediction involves a classifier that generates a binary prediction y˜ based on a feature vector x containing the data
corresponding to a particular individual. If the distribution of y˜ over x is the same as that of the binary outcome y, we
have perfect prediction. Hence, given a sufficiently large sample, the fairness and other attributes of the predictor can be
evaluated by comparing predictions y˜ with outcomes y.
We denote individuals for whom y = 1 as being members of the “positive” class and individuals for whom y = 0 as
being members of the “negative” class. For instance, if an algorithm predicts whether students will pass a test, y will be
1 for the students who pass (and who are therefore members of the positive class) and 0 for students who fail (and are
thus members of the negative class). While in this scenario the “positive” outcome y = 1 corresponds to the desirable
outcome, this will not always be the case. To take another example, in evaluating whether a parolee commits a new
crime within a given time frame, y = 1 can be used to denote the “positive” (but obviously undesirable) outcome that
the parolee has committed a new crime.
We also assume that the dataset can be divided into different groups based on attributes such as race, gender, etc., that
may be of interest when evaluating whether an algorithm is biased. While there can be any number of such groups
in different contexts, we will restrict our discussion to scenarios in which it is possible to identify two groups of
individuals, with group membership indicated using a binary variable G. Finally, for some of the metrics we discuss, it
will be necessary to consider a real-valued score s ∈ [0, 1] that is computed for each individual which can optionally
then be subject to thresholding to generate a binary prediction y˜. In sum, we use the following notation:
• x: feature vector
• G: binary group index
• y˜: binary prediction
• y: binary outcome
• s: classifier score
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We address some of the metrics that have received significant recent attention in the literature and/or that we believe
present opportunities for more detailed comparative analysis. We do not claim to consider all possible fairness metrics
(for example, we do not address fairness through awareness as proposed by Dwork et al. [6]).
To help clarify the discussion, in what follows we will sometimes refer to the following example involving loans.
Consider two groups of people, which we will denote as the orange group (denoted group 0) and the blue group (group
1). The orange group has 60 members while the blue group has 40 members. If all the members of both groups were
given loans, 40 members of the orange group and 20 members of the blue group would repay on time—these are the
positive outcomes. However, among these 60 positive outcomes, we assume that the model predicted that only 28 of
the orange group and 8 of the blue group will repay. These are the true positives for the two groups. Thus, the model
correctly predicted the positive outcome of 36 individuals.
Similarly, if all members of both groups were given loans, 20 members of the orange group and 20 members of the
blue group would default on the loan—these are the negative outcomes. From among these 40 negative outcomes, we
assume that the model correctly predicted 12 of the defaulters in the orange group and 16 of the defaulters in the blue
group. These are the true negatives for the two groups. In the aggregate, the model correctly predicted the negative
outcome for 28 individuals. The table below summarizes these predictions and outcomes. We also add that, to make
the illustration of the concepts more tractable, this example and the other numerical examples in this paper use small
sample sizes (and in doing so implicitly assume statistical significance despite those small sample sizes). Of course, in
a real scenario, to make reliable inferences on statistical outcomes and therefore on fairness assessments based on those
outcomes, the sample sizes would need to be much larger.
Table 1: Illustrative Example
Orange Group Blue Group Total
True positives 28 8 36
False negatives 12 12 24
True negatives 12 16 28
False positives 8 4 12
Positives 40 20 60
Negatives 20 20 40
Total 60 40 100
2.2 Equalized odds and equality of opportunity
A predictor satisfies equalized odds if both the true positive rate (TPR) and (separately) the false positive rate (FPR) are
the same across groups. More formally, equalized odds requires that the group-specific TPR satisfy p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G =
0) = p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G = 1) and that the group-specific FPR satisfy p(y˜ = 1|y = 0, G = 0) = p(y˜ = 1|y = 0, G = 1).
[11] Since, the metric demands that the error rates be the same across groups, Chouldechova [3] describes this metric
using the term ”error rate balance”. In the example, for the orange and blue groups, the TPRs are 0.7 and 0.4 respectively,
and the FPRs are 0.2 and 0.4 respectively. Thus, the example fails to satisfy equalized odds.
It is also worth noting that a related and less stringent metric, equality of opportunity [11], can be defined by requiring
only that the TPR be equal across groups, with no requirement imposed on the FPR. Thus, equalized odds implies
equality of opportunity, though not vice versa.
2.3 Statistical parity
Statistical parity [3], [5] (sometimes referred to as group fairness [6] or demographic parity [12], [13]) is achieved
when members of both groups are predicted to belong to the positive class at the same rate. Mathematically, this
means satisfying p(y˜ = 1|G = 0) = p(y˜ = 1|G = 1). Notably, this metric gives no consideration to the outcomes y.
Therefore, when the base rates p(y|G) differ across the two groups, statistical parity rules out the perfect predictor.
In the orange/blue group example, 36 of the 60 orange group members and 12 of the 40 blue group members were
predicted to belong to the positive class. Since p(y˜ = 1|G = 0) = 36/60 = 0.6 is not the same as p(y˜ = 1|G = 1) =
12/40 = 0.3, the example does not satisfy statistical parity.
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2.4 Predictive parity
Consistent with Chouldechova [3], Verma et al. [5], and MacCarthy [9] we consider that predictive parity is satisfied
when the positive predictive value(PPV) is the same for both groups. PPV is defined as the probability that individuals
predicted to belong to the positive class actually belong to the positive class. Mathematically, predictive parity therefore
requires p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 0) = p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 1).
We note that some authors define predictive parity in a more constrained manner, requiring not only parity for PPV, but
also for its counterpart, negative predictive value (NPV), which requires additionally satisfying p(y = 0|y˜ = 0, G =
0) = p(y = 0|y˜ = 0, G = 1). Mayson [8] uses the term “overall predictive parity” to describe a predictor with equality
across groups in both PPV and NPV, while Berk et al. [4] call this “conditional use accuracy equality”.
In the loan example, the model predicted a total of 48 members across both groups to belong to the positive class.
However, only 36 out of these were correct predictions; the rest were false positives. Hence, the overall PPV is 36/48 =
0.75. Taken separately, the model predicted a total of 36 members of the orange group and a total of 12 members of the
blue group to belong to the positive class. From these predictions, however, only 28 of the orange group and 8 of the
blue group were correct. Therefore, the PPV for the orange group is p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 0) = 28/36 = 7/9 = 0.77
and for the blue group is p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 1) = 8/12 = 0.66. Since these values differ, the model from our
example does not satisfy predictive parity.
The fairness metrics discussed above can be evaluated using knowledge only of binary predictions and outcomes. By
contrast, we now discuss a set of metrics involving explicit generation of a continuous-valued score s. Optionally, the
score can serve as the input to a thresholding function that outputs a binary prediction, though scores can also be used
directly, without any thresholding.
2.5 Calibration
An algorithm is calibrated if for all scores s, the individuals who have the same score have the same probability of
belonging to the positive class, regardless of group membership. [3] [14] Mathematically, this is expressed through
p(y = 1|S = s,G = 0) = p(y = 1|S = s,G = 1). This metric has been termed test-fairness by Chouldechova [3],
Verma et al. [5], and Mehrabi et al. [12] and as matching conditional frequencies by Hardt et al. [11]
There is another related metric termed well-calibration [5] or calibration within groups [2][4] that imposes an additional,
more stringent condition. In order for a model to be well-calibrated (or to have calibration within groups), individuals
assigned score s must have probability s of belonging to the positive class. If this condition is satisfied, then test-
fairness will also automatically be satisfied, though the reverse does not hold. The difference between calibration and
well-calibration is simply one of mapping; the scores of a calibrated predictor can, using a suitable transformation, be
converted to scores satisfying well-calibration.
2.6 Balance for positive/negative class
Kleinberg et al. [2] have noted that when the average score s for all individuals constituting the group-specific
positive class is the same for both groups of interest, it can be said that there exists balance for the positive class.
Similarly, balance for the negative class is satisfied when the average score s for members of the negative class
are equal, regardless of group membership. Mathematically this is expressed in terms of expected values. For the
negative class, balance requires E[s|y = 0, G = 0] = E[s|y = 0, G = 1], and for the positive class balance requires
E[s|y = 1, G = 0] = E[s|y = 1, G = 1].
As Pleiss et al. [15] have explained, this can be viewed as a generalization of the equalized odds metric to non-binary
cases. To see this, note that when the score s can take on only the two values 0 and 1, the score itself is the prediction
and the term E[s|y = 0, G] then represents the false positive rate and the term E[s|y = 1, G] represents the true positive
rate. And, as noted above, under equalized odds the TPR and FPR are equal across groups.
3 Comparisons and trade-offs between metrics
Different fairness metrics formalize varying intuitive notions of fairness. This raises the question of the conditions
under which more than one metric can be simultaneously satisfied, and relatedly, the ways in which different metrics
might be in tension.
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We will analyze metrics under the assumption that the “base rate” differs across groups. The base rate of a group is the
ratio of people in the group who belong to the positive class (y = 1) to the total number of people in that group. Thus,
having non-equal base rates across groups means that p(y = 1|G = 0) 6= p(y = 1|G = 1).
In the subsequent discussion, to simplify the equations we will use the following terms as defined here:
• TPRg = p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G = g), g ∈ {0, 1}— the group-specific true positive rates.
• FPRg = p(y˜ = 1|y = 0, G = g), g ∈ {0, 1}— the group-specific false positive rates.
• PPVg = p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = g), g ∈ {0, 1}— the group-specific positive predictive value.
3.1 Statistical parity, equalized odds and predictive parity
Trade-offs among statistical parity, equalized odds and predictive parity have received significant attention in algorithmic
fairness literature under a variety of formulations. Chouldechova [3] articulates the tradeoffs between predictive parity
and equalized odds empirically. Kleinberg et al. [2], while not directly referring to these terms, give a closely related
result, writing that “the calibration condition and the balance conditions for the positive and negative classes" are “in
general incompatible with each other; they can only be simultaneously satisfied in certain highly constrained cases.”
Berk et al. [4] discuss incompatibility among metrics by taking several cases and examining the trade-offs in those
scenarios.
We offer a common mathematical framework to examine trade-offs among statistical parity, equalized odds and
predictive parity. We provide proofs regarding the combination of all three of these metrics and also explore conditions
under which it may be possible to simultaneously satisfy two metrics. To provide an initial framing, it is interesting
to note that using the basic probability relation p(A,B) = p(A|B)p(B) = p(B|A)p(A), the respective probability
distributions associated with each of these three metrics can be expressed as follows:
p(y, y˜|G) = p(y|y˜, G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Predictive Parity
× p(y˜|G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Statistical Parity
= p(y˜|y,G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equalized Odds
× p(y|G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Base Rate
(1)
3.1.1 All three?
This section considers the feasibility of satisfying all three metrics under the assumption of unequal base rates. We start
by assuming a predictor that satisfies both statistical parity and equalized odds, and then examining if it can also satisfy
predictive parity. From equation 1, we have:
p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G) = p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G)× p(y = 1|G)
p(y˜ = 1|G) (2)
Since the predictor satisfies equalized odds, the TPR must be the same across groups and therefore, we denote
TPR0 = TPR1 = TPR. And since the predictor by definition also satisfies statistical parity, p(y˜ = 1|G = 0) = p(y˜ =
1|G = 1) = p(y˜ = 1) Imposing these conditions and taking the difference of the PPV values of the two groups gives:
p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 0)− p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 1) = TPR[p(y = 1|G = 0)− p(y = 1|G = 1)]
p(y˜ = 1)
(3)
Predictive parity requires that the PPV be equal across both groups, and therefore that the difference on the left side
of the above equation be zero, which in turn can only occur when the base rates across the two groups are equal as
indicated by the right side of the equation. Note that equalized odds requires both the TPR and the FPR to be the
same. However, by demonstrating the incompatibility of just TPR in this section, we provide a sufficient proof for the
incompatibility of equalized odds in the given scenario. Thus, when the two groups have unequal base rates, satisfying
all three of statistical parity, predictive parity and equalized odds is impossible. This remains true even if the predictor
is perfect, as a perfect predictor can not (when the base rates are unequal) satisfy statistical parity.
3.1.2 Statistical parity and predictive parity
We now consider conditions under which a predictor can satisfy both statistical and predictive parity. Recall that when
statistical parity holds, we have p(y˜ = 1|G = 0) = p(y˜ = 1|G = 1) = p(y˜ = 1). Taking the difference in PPV across
the two groups gives:
p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 0)− p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 1) = TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0)− TPR1p(y = 1|G = 1)
p(y˜ = 1)
(4)
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Under predictive parity the left side of the equation must be zero, which in turn requires that the ratio of the true positive
rates of the two groups be the reciprocal of the ratio of the base rates, i.e.:
TPR0
TPR1
=
p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G = 0)
p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G = 1) =
p(y = 1|G = 1)
p(y = 1|G = 0) =
Base Rate of Group 1
Base Rate of Group 0
(5)
Thus, while statistical and predictive parity can be simultaneously satisfied even with different base rates, the utility of
such a predictor is limited when the ratio of the base rates differs significantly from 1, as this forces the true positive
rate for one of the groups to be very low.
As mentioned above, the definition of predictive parity used here, consistent with [3], only requires different groups
to have the same PPV. However, if we were to consider the “overall predictive parity” [8], and require a predictor to
also have the same NPV across groups, the system would be overconstrained and it would not generally be possible to
simultaneously satisfy statistical parity and predictive parity.
3.1.3 Equalized odds and predictive parity
Chouldechova (2017) [3] observes that "predictive parity is incompatible with error rate balance when prevalence
differs across groups," (p. 5). (As noted above, Chouldechova uses “error rate balance” to describe what we refer to
here as equalized odds.) We explore this incompatibility in more detail. As before when equalized odds and predictive
parity are satisfied, we have TPR0 = TPR1, FPR0 = FPR1, and PPV0 = PPV1. Noting that
p(y˜ = 1|G) =
∑
y
p(y˜ = 1|y,G)p(y|G) = p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G)p(y = 1|G) + p(y˜ = 1|y = 0, G)p(y = 0|G)
=⇒ p(y˜ = 1|G) = TPR0p(y = 1|G) + FPR0p(y = 0|G) (6)
and considering equation 1, we can write:
p(y˜ = 1|y = 1, G = 0)p(y = 1|G = 0) = p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G = 0)[TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0) + FPR0p(y = 0|G = 0)]
=⇒ TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0) = PPV0[TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0) + FPR0p(y = 0|G = 0)]
TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0) = PPV0[TPR0p(y = 1|G = 0) + FPR0(1− p(y = 1|G = 0))]
=⇒ p(y = 1|G = 0) = PPV0FPR0
PPV0FPR0 + (1− PPV0)TPR0 (7)
Likewise, p(y = 1|G = 1) = PPV1FPR1
PPV1FPR1 + (1− PPV1)TPR1 (8)
But since TPR0 = TPR1, FPR0 = FPR1 and PPV0 = PPV1, equations 7 and 8 will be identical, so base rates for
groups 1 and 2 will be the same: p(y = 1|G = 0) = p(y = 1|G = 1). Hence, in the absence of perfect prediction,
the base rates have to be equal for both equalized odds and predictive parity to simultaneously hold. When perfect
prediction is achieved, equations 7 and 8 take on the indefinite form 0/0 so therefore do not convey anything definitive
about base rates in that scenario.
We also note that the metric equal opportunity (a less strict counterpart to equalized odds that requires only equal
TPR across groups) is compatible with predictive parity. This is evident from equations 7 and 8 when the condition
FPR0 = FPR1 is removed, thereby allowing equalized opportunity and predictive parity to be simultaneously satisfied
even with unequal base rates. However, achieving this condition with unequal base rates will require that the FPR
differs across the groups. When the difference between the base rates is large, the variation between group-specific
FPRs may have to be significant which may reduce suitability for some applications. Hence, while equal opportunity
and predictive parity are compatible in the presence of unequal base rates, practitioners should consider the cost (in
terms of FPR difference) before attempting to simultaneously achieve both. A similar analysis is possible when we
considering parity in negative predictive value instead of positive predictive value, i.e. equal opportunity and parity in
NPV are compatible, but only at the cost of variation between group-specific true negative rates (TNRs).
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3.1.4 Equalized odds and statistical parity
We now consider if a predictor can simultaneously satisfy equalized odds and statistical parity. As before, for
TPR = TPR0 = TPR1 (equal TPR) and FPR = FPR0 = FPR1 (equal FPR):
p(y˜ = 1|G) = TPR[p(y = 1|G)] + FPR[p(y = 0|G)]
=⇒ p(y˜ = 1|G = 0)− p(y˜ = 1|G = 1) =TPR[p(y = 1|G = 0)− p(y = 1|G = 1)]
+FPR[p(y = 0|G = 0)− p(y = 0|G = 1)] (9)
=⇒ p(y˜ = 1|G = 0)− p(y˜ = 1|G = 1) = (TPR− FPR)[p(y = 1|G = 0)− p(y = 1|G = 1)] (10)
Statistical parity requires the left side of equation 10 to be zero. For the equation to hold, this means the right side
must also be zero, which can only occur when either TPR = FPR or p(y = 1|G = 0) = p(y = 1|G = 1). The latter
case, however, violates the assumption that the base rates are different. Therefore to have both statistical parity and
equalized odds, the only possibility is to have TPR = FPR, i.e. the false positive rate and the true positive rate have to
be equal. Thus, while simultaneously achieving statistical parity and equalized odds is mathematically possible, it is not
particularly useful since the goal is typically to develop a predictor in which the TPR is significantly higher than the
FPR.
3.2 Predictive parity and calibration
There has been some confusion in the literature regarding the relationship between these two metrics. Chouldechova [3]
has correctly mentioned that “While predictive parity and calibration look like very similar criteria, well-calibrated
scores can fail to satisfy predictive parity at a given threshold,” However, in other papers, the discussion on these two
metrics sometimes gives less attention to the specifics of how they relate than we think is merited. Given this backdrop,
in the present section we explain the difference between predictive parity and calibration with a mathematical derivation
and an example.
It is possible to view calibration as a generalization of predictive parity to the non-binary setting. The score s discussed
in relation to calibration is generally continuous-valued. However, in the special case in which it is limited to the two
values 0 and 1 and therefore becomes the prediction itself, achieving calibration is the same as achieving equality across
groups in both PPV and NPV. Thus, this satisfies both predictive parity (due to equality across groups in PPV) as well
as ”overall predictive parity” (due to equality across groups in both PPV and NPV).
Of course, in general the score s is not binary. A continuous-valued score can be binarized through a thresholding
operation to generate a binary prediction y˜. However, it is not the case that thresholding a calibrated score in this
manner necessarily leads to predictive parity.
To prove this, consider a threshold sth ∈ [0, 1], such that ∀s > sth, y˜ = 1 and y˜ = 0 otherwise. Hence, the distribution
relevant to predictive parity p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G) can be expressed p(y = 1|s > sth, G). Using this we can write:
p(y, s > sth|G) =
∫ 1
sth
p(y|s,G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
calibration term
p(s|G)ds (11)
=⇒ p(y|s > sth, G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
predictive parity term
=
∫ 1
sth
p(y|s,G)p(s|G)ds∫ 1
sth
p(s|G)ds (12)
The above equation relates predictive parity to calibration, showing that even when the calibration term p(y|s,G) is
the same for both groups, the probability distribution of the score, expressed in equation 12 through p(s|G), can vary
across groups in a way that causes predictive parity not to be satisfied. To make this more intuitive, we will consider a
special case where there are only two score values s1 and s2 above the threshold sth such that p(s|G) 6= 0. In other
words, all individuals who receive risk scores above the threshold have the possibility of receiving one of only two
scores, s1 or s2. Hence, p(s > sth|G) = p(s = s1|G) + p(s = s2|G).
Under this special case equation 12 reduces to:
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p(y = 1|y˜ = 1, G) = p(y = 1|s = s1, G)p(s = s1|G) + p(y = 1|s = s2, G)p(s = s2|G)
p(s = s1|G) + p(s = s2|G) (13)
Using this scenario, consider an example in which we have 100 people in each of two groups: orange and blue (this
is a new example, unrelated to the example using orange and blue groups introduced earlier in the paper). Consider
further an algorithm that only gives one of three possible scores (0.25, 0.5 or 0.75) to every individual’s loan application.
Suppose that scores are being binarized using a threshold of 0.49, such that any individual with a score above 0.49 is
deemed to belong to the positive class. In this example, this would mean there are two possible scores (0.5 and 0.75)
that can lead to a positive prediction. This is illustrated in Table 2 given below.
Table 2: Predictive Parity and Calibration Example
Score Orange Group Blue Group
Prediction after
threshold with
sth = 0.49
0.25 40 (16) 40 (16) Negative
0.5 20 (10) 40 (20) Positive
0.75 40 (30) 20 (15) Positive
Total 100(56) 100(51)
The first column represents the score that the model assigned. In the second and third columns, the numbers outside the
parentheses convey the number of people in the group assigned that score. The numbers in parentheses represent the
number of people from those assigned that score who actually belong to the positive class. In this example the predictor
is calibrated, since given a score, the fraction of people who actually belong to the positive class is independent of
the group. For example, for score 0.5, 10/20 = 0.5 = 50% of the people in the orange group with that score and
20/40 = 0.5 = 50% of the people in the blue group with that score belong to the positive class.
Does this model satisfy predictive parity? Choosing 0.49 as the threshold gives a total of 60 positive predictions for
both the orange group and the blue group. However, of the people with scores greater than 0.49, only 40 members in the
orange group and 35 members of the blue group are actually in the positive class, resulting in a PPV of 40/60 = 0.66
for the orange group and 35/60 = 0.583 for the blue group. Thus, while the predictor is calibrated, choosing a threshold
of 0.49 does not lead to a set of binary predictions that satisfy predictive parity.
It is also interesting to note that if all persons who had a score of 0.25 are instead given a score of 0.4, the model will not
only be calibrated (because, as before, people with the same score have the same probability of belonging to the positive
class) but also well-calibrated (because, due to this change in scoring, for all scores the score itself would give the
probability of belonging to the positive class). However, this change in score would have no impact on the thresholding
example above, illustrating that even a well-calibrated model does not, after applying a threshold to produce binary
predictions, necessarily satisfy predictive parity.
This discussion can be further generalized. Consider the comparison between statistical parity and calibration given by
Kleinberg et al. [2]. Kleinberg et al. give an alternate definition of statistical parity which is independent of the choice
of threshold, defining it as the condition in which both groups have the same average score. They then prove that when
there are unequal base rates and imperfect prediction, statistical parity is incompatible with well-calibration.
In one sense, the Kleinberg et al. definition of statistical parity can be understood as a generalization of the binary
case. This is because in the special case where the score itself is binary and represents the prediction, the Kleinberg et
al. definition reduces to the common (i.e., binary) definition of statistical parity that we have provided in section 2.3.
However, when there is both a score s and a binary prediction y˜ obtained by thresholding the score, the fact that there
was statistical parity prior to thresholding in accordance with the definition from Kleinberg et al. does not necessarily
imply that there will be statistical parity of the binary predictions in accordance with 2.3. Stated another way, if, prior
to thresholding, the average score s is the same across two groups, it does not necessarily follow that thresholding will
produce predictions y˜ in which p(y˜|G = 0) = p(y˜|G = 1).
Under the standard definition of statistical parity (in 2.3) it is possible to simultaneously satisfy both statistical parity
and calibration. Consider, again, the example in table 2, where despite different base rates, when a threshold of 0.49 is
applied to binarize the calibrated scores, it also satisfies statistical parity (for both groups of 100, 60 individuals are
predicted to belong to the positive class). The base rates are also different since a total of 56 people from the orange
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group and 51 people from the blue group belong to the positive class. Again, as before, if all persons who had a score
of 0.25 were instead given a score of 0.4, the model will be well-calibrated and still satisfy statistical parity for the
threshold of 0.49. Also, the prediction is clearly imperfect. Thus, statistical parity (as we have defined it in section
2.3 above) is not necessarily incompatible with having calibration (and well-calibration) even when the base rates are
different and there is imperfect prediction.
This underscores the importance of being attentive to the difference between fairness metrics designed for use in relation
to scores s and those intended for use with binary predictions. While it is straightforward to convert scores to binary
values through thresholding, the ease of the conversion masks important complexities regarding the extent to which
fairness metrics might be met after the thresholding process. In the example above, the scores were calibrated, and
upon application of a threshold of 0.49, the binary predictions exhibited statistical parity. However, the same underlying
distribution of scores, had they been subject to a threshold of 0.55, would have yielded predictions without statistical
parity. More generally, we believe that there is room for—and a need for—fairness metrics in relation to both continuous
scores s as well as binary predictions y˜. But the benefits offered by having a greater number of tools for examining
fairness must be balanced with an awareness of the issues that can arise when working across these two domains.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Several conclusions arise from the discussion above. With respect to metrics such as statistical parity, equalized odds and
predictive parity that evaluate fairness by comparing binary predictions with binary outcomes, pairwise combinations of
metrics can be simultaneously satisfied only under very limited conditions, if at all. For example, when the base rates
are different, satisfying both statistical parity and predictive parity requires that the ratio of group-specific true positive
rates be the inverse of the ratio of the base rates. When the ratio of the base rates does not deviate too far from 1, this
constraint can be met while also preserving high true positive rates for both groups. The question of how far a deviation
from 1 in the base rate ratio (and therefore in the inverse of the TPR ratio) would still be acceptable would of course
be context dependent. For large (or small) base rate ratios, the resulting predictor would necessarily have a low true
positive rate for one of the groups. We also showed that equalized odds and predictive parity are incompatible when
the base rates across two groups differs. In addition, we showed that, given unequal base rates, equalized odds and
statistical parity can only be simultaneously met in the rather impractical case where the true positive and false positive
rates are equal. The above results illustrate that, for unequal base rates, a given pair of metrics can be 1) mathematically
incompatible, 2) mathematically compatible but under constraints that are problematic from a policy standpoint, or 3)
mathematically compatible under constraints that are consistent with positive policy outcomes.
With respect to more generalized predictors that generate a (non-binary) score, we explored the relationship between
calibration (computed with respect to score that can in general be continuous) and predictive parity when that score is
subject to thresholding to generate a binary prediction. We observed the value of utilizing fairness metrics designed
for use in relation to scores, while also emphasizing some of the complexities involved in working across continuous
and binary domains. In particular, we noted that calibrated scores, after thresholding, may still generate predictions
that satisfy statistical parity, though threshold choice can play an important role in determining whether or not such
conditions are satisfied.
In closing, we note that in addition to the above considerations, fairness metric selection can also be guided by the
observability of each statistic in practice. For example, in the context of loan approvals, loans will typically only be
given to the subset of applicants who are predicted to repay. When this occurs, it will be impossible to observe statistics
such as false negatives, true negatives, negative predictive value, true positive rate, and true negative rate. By contrast,
the positive predictive value will be readily observable, suggesting that a metric such as predictive parity would be
easier to evaluate in practice.
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